In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination-and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past-are real and must be addressed. Not just with words, but with deeds-by investing in our schools and our communities….
Introduction
Racial segregation of one form or another has been a recurring social concern throughout human history. In the United States, much has changed since Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended de jure racial segregation. But despite the improvements in black educational achievement, the narrowing of black-white income gaps, and even the election of the first African-American President, de facto racial segregation continues to be one of the country's most prevalent social issues.
Addressing this important topic, economists have explored the social mechanisms driving segregation. Schelling (1969 Schelling ( , 1971 and Pancs and Vriend (2007) have shown that the dynamics of neighborhood "tipping" can force segregation in equilibrium even when there are tastes for some integration. More recently, Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) have shown that, empirically, white households flee neighborhoods once they become 5-20% minority. Consistent with this phenomenon, Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) and Kiel and Zabel (1996) find that white communities do command a price premium in part precisely because of their whiteness. In related work, Hoff and Sen (2005) and Sethi and Somanathan (2004) show how positive externalities from the activities of richer households can impact community composition. While Bayer, Fang, and McMillan (2005) and Sethi and Somanathan (2004) show that reducing income inequality between groups can actually increase group segregation, because richer minorities need no longer join whites to obtain high levels of public goods.
While this rich literature has made significant contributions to our understanding of the equilibrium properties of segregation, it has almost completely ignored the role played by public goods and/or location-specific amenities in the process of segregation.
1 This is an important shortcoming because, as the above epigraph illustrates, many of the policy remedies for reducing group inequity focus specifically on investments in minority communities. Investments in education are only one example. In addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides Community Development Block Grants (totaling $125B since 1974); the US EPA's Superfund and Brownfields programs clean up contaminated sites and encourage redevelopment; enterprise zones provide tax incentives for businesses; and the 1992
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act steers Fannie and Freddie investments to low-income and minority communities. Clearly, such place-based interventions play a central role in efforts to address social concerns associated with segregation.
In this paper, we advance the literature by introducing an exogenous location-specific public good (to be manipulated by public policy) into a model of group segregation. In this sense, we combine features of the segregation and public goods literatures. 2 First, following the tradition of Schelling (1969 Schelling ( , 1971 , we consider preferences for the endogenous demographic make-up of the community. 3 Second, following the tradition of Tiebout (1956) , we include heterogeneity in willingness to pay for public goods. In particular, we adapt a model of vertically differentiated communities from Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984) , a model used in other recent work as well Walsh 2008, Sethi and Somanathan 2004) .
We combine these two traditions into a general equilibrium model in which households choose a community based on both its demographics and its exogenous public good. We then characterize the equilibria of such a model and derive the comparative statics of policy shocks to the local public goods. The model generates several results regarding the importance of placebased amenities. First, we establish that, even when sorting is driven by tastes for the exogenous 1 The one exception is Becker and Murphy (2000) which is discussed below.
2 Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) show how these two models can be nested in a more general social interaction model.
3 Throughout our analysis a fundamental assumption is that individuals of a given type tend toward living together due to preferences to live with individuals of their own type. We note, though, that identical results would be obtained if the model assumed that concentrations of individuals of a given type lead to social spillovers that disproportionately benefit that type (i.e. concentrations of businesses, community networks, restaurants, non-profit services, etc.). public good and not by demographic tastes, some racial segregation will result, with the richer group enjoying higher levels of the public good. Second, we show that introducing tastes for an endogenous demographic composition can drive further segregation, as suggested by Schelling's "tipping model" -and may likely explain some of the variation Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) observe in their empirical estimates of tipping points in U.S. Cities. As a pragmatic matter, this increased segregation is likely to further the differences in the average level of the public good enjoyed by the two groups. Finally, we show that place-based interventions that improve the public good in a low-quality high-minority community may actually increase group segregation, as richer minorities are more likely to migrate into the community following the improvement.
Essentially, when differences in public goods become less important, group-based sorting begins to dominate income-based sorting on the public good.
In the final section of the paper, we use large changes in the distribution of air pollution from industrial facilities that occurred in California between 1990 and 2000 to illustrate the predictions of the model. Consistent with our model's predictions, we find that large scale improvements in the dirtiest sites are associated with increased racial sorting on exposure to toxic air pollution.
Theory Model
In this section, we develop an equilibrium model of the links between race, demographic composition, public goods, and location choice. In the recent literature, the model is most similar to work by Becker and Murphy (2000) , Sethi and Somanathan (2004) and Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) , but differs from these papers in several important respects. It resembles Becker and Murphy (2000) in combining preferences for an exogenous public good with the endogenous demographic community, but differs in incorporating income distributions and heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for amenities. Generalizing their model in this way is crucial for evaluating income-based segregation. On the other hand, in adapting the vertically differentiated framework of Epple et al. (1984) , our model resembles Sethi and Somanathan (2004) and Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) . But it differs from Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) , who only consider the exogenous good, in including racial groups and demographic preferences. And it differs from Sethi and Somanathan (2004) in including an exogenous public good. 4 Including this public good is obviously essential to analyzing the kinds of policy shocks that motivate our paper.
Model Basics
We consider a model with two communities, j ∈ {C1, C2}, each comprised of an identical set of fixed-size housing stock with measure 0.5. The price of this fixed housing unit is P j . Residents of these communities comprise two demographic types, r ∈ {b, w}. Type-b, the minority, has measure β < 0.5 and type-w has measure (1-β). One obvious interpretation of these types is as racial groups (w for white and b for blacks). However, in principle they could represent any pair of groups with a poorer minority and richer.
There is heterogeneity in income Y within each type, which is described by the continuous distribution functions F r (Y). We impose the following two assumptions on the income distributions of type b and w individuals:
The first condition requires that the population of type w individuals is richer than the population of type b individuals in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The second limits the difference in income distributions between the two groups. In particular, it requires that when communities are perfectly stratified by income, some members of each group will reside in each community.
Each individual is assumed to consume one unit of housing and to have preferences over a numeraire good x (with a price set to unity), an exogenous community public good level G j and endogenous community demographic composition. Tastes for demographic composition are captured by , where is the proportion of residents in community j who are of type r. Individuals of each type experience the same service flow from the public good.
However, as is clear from the expression for , they view the demographic composition differently.
Conditional on choosing location j, utility for an individual of type r and income y is given by equation (3):
The function U(·) is continuous and increasing at a decreasing rate in both of its arguments, and Finally, without loss of generality, we assume that when public good levels differ the 5 5 In their recent work on tipping points, Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) find that ρ w is around 0.9, which is consistent with the survey literature. This survey literature also suggests that an appropriate level for ρ b is around 0.5 (Farley et al. 1978 and Krysan 2002) -such preferences are consistent with this restriction on .
level of the public good is higher in Community 2 than in Community 1:
. 
By definition, the bid makes these individuals indifferent between the two communities. Note that the continuity of . and . implies that is continuous in and .
Equilibria in the Model
To provide intuition about the equilibrium properties of the model, we begin by working through a four step process for evaluating the potential for different demographic sortings to be supported as equilibria.
In the first step, we note that the entire demographic profile of a given sorting of households can be expressed solely as a function of , the proportion of Community 1 that is type w. To begin, once the proportion of Community 1 that is type w has been identified, the proportion of Community 1 that is type b follows directly. Similar logic leads directly to the identification of and :
= 2(1 -β) -; and = 1 -;
We graph these relationships in Panel 1 of Figure 1 . Given the requirement that housing markets clear (equilibrium condition E3), these relationships are purely tautological and are the same for all possible parameterizations of the model.
Given the complete identification of , the demographic components of . can be expressed as a function of , . In the second step, and the exogenously determined levels of lead directly to the identification of , for both communities and types -again as a function of . Naturally, the utilities are also a function of the exogenous public good and the specific parameters of the utility function. Panel 2
of Figure 1 illustrates one particular specification with bliss-point (.9 for type-w and .5 for type b) preferences over demographic composition.
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The Figure shows that, for this example, the utility received by type w in C1 is increasing in up to the bliss point at 0.9, at which point it begins to fall. The utility it receives in C2 likewise is increasing in up to the same bliss point, but this is mapped in the figure as being decreasing in except below the point where = 0.6 (which is where = 0.9 
. 5 2 2 1 ,
. 5 1 .
We can similarly characterize the derivatives of these boundary incomes with respect to Panel 3 shows, for our example, the boundary incomes as a function of .
Because this example uses uniform income distributions, the boundary incomes are linear in . When is below 1-β, type-w individuals prefer Community 2. As a result, single-crossing implies that they will sort such that the richest type-w individuals locate in C2.
Over this range, the boundary income is that of the poorest type-w individual in C2 (alternatively the richest type-w individual in C1). As at first increases toward 0.75, the measure of type-w households living in C2 must decrease. Thus, the boundary income must increase. But when increases above 1-β, the relative ranking of the communities changes and rich type-w individuals now locate in C1. Thus, the boundary income is now decreasing in .
Because in this example the community switch occurs where type-w individuals are equally distributed between the two communities, there is only a kink in the boundary income function at the switch. As we shall see, in cases where public good levels differ and indifference between the two communities occur where ≠ 1-β, there will be a discontinuity in the boundary income function.
While Based on the discussion to this point, we make the following observations. Observation 1. Some type-w individuals always live in both communities. This must be the case because the measure of type-w individuals is greater than 0.5. More specifically, the share of type w in any community can never fall below 1-2β. In contrast, all type-b individuals can reside in only one of the two communities.
Observation 2. When V w C1 ≠ V w C2 , there is some at which type-w individuals are indifferent. All type-w individuals with income higher than will reside in the more desirable (to w) community and poorer type-w individuals will live in the less desirable. Moreover, can never drop below 0.5 1 ⁄
. In contrast, it is possible that b's boundary income may fall to Y min .
Observation 3. The community that type w perceives as more desirable will be more expensive:
This relationship must always hold, for if a community was more desirable to type w and less expensive, all type-w individuals would choose to live in it, and the demand for housing would exceed supply.
These observations are general to the model and do not depend on the features of the example depicted in Figure 1 .
As noted in Observation 1, because β<0.5, it is possible for all type-b individuals to live in the same community. We will refer to equilibria where all type-b individuals live in the same community as "segregated" and equilibria where some type-b individuals live in both communities as "integrated." We make the following observations about each of these cases. 
Max
. The opposite and symmetrical case holds for equilibria where all type-b individuals locate in C2.
Observation 5. In all integrated equilibria, both types must agree on which community is more desirable, and = . For integration, some members of each type must be willing to pay to live in the more desirable community.
The upshot of these observations is that equilibria can be identified by an analysis of the bids of individuals with the boundary incomes. We call this the "boundary income bid function."
Note that it is not the willingness to pay function for an individual, but a bid function over an endogenous income level (the boundary incomes associated with each sorting). If at any integrated allocation the two groups' boundary income bid functions are equal, = , then that allocation is an integrated equilibrium. A segregated equilibrium with C2 all-w exists if at that allocation ≤ . And a segregated equilibrium with C1 all-w exists if at that allocation ≤ .
As increases, the change in each boundary income bid function is represented by Equation (10):
where is the derivative of the utility function with respect to the numeraire, evaluated in Community j at the appropriate income (i.e. ) and all other derivatives are similarly defined. is all-w. At the far right is the opposite and symmetric segregated equilibrium. In the middle, there is an integrated equilibrium in which the two communities have the same composition, and everybody is indifferent.
Characterizing the equilibria and their comparative statics
Having discussed the logic of the model, this section now characterizes the equilibria and their comparative statics. We first establish the existence of equilibria in the model.
Proposition 1.
For preference functions and income distributions satisfying conditions (1) to (3) in Section 2.1, there is at least one allocation that satisfies equilibrium conditions E.1 to E3.
Proof.
Consider the sorting at = 1-2β. (This is the point where = 1 and is depicted as the left-hand side of Panel 4 in Figure 1 ). At this point either ≤ or > . In the former case this point represents a segregated equilibrium and thus existence is trivial. Consider now the sorting at = 1. Again, at this point either ≤ or > . And again, in the former case, this point represents a segregated equilibrium. Finally, we must consider the possibility that > at = 1-2β and > at = 1. But in this case, by continuity, the boundary income bid functions must cross at some point, where = , which is also an equilibrium.
In addition to the existence of such equilibria, we are also concerned with stability of equilibria. We adopt the following definition of local stability.
Definition. An equilibrium is locally stable if there is a measure µ such that after switching µ marginal type-w individuals with µ marginal type-b individuals across two communities, they prefer to switch back. (Marginal individuals are those closest to r Y .) 9 In this case, the individuals moved from Community 2 will outbid the individuals moved from Community 1; thus moving back to Community 2 and restoring the initial equilibrium.
As discussed above, equilibria occur either at corners (the case of segregation) or in the interior (the case of integration). Whenever corner equilibria exist, they will be locally stable.
For interior solutions, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the local stability conditions are satisfied whenever the type-b boundary income bid function crosses the type-w boundary income bid function from above.
Additionally, by analogy to a "regular" Arrow-Debreu economy, we can define a regular 9 Note that in general we must consider two possibilities: first, moving a type-w individual from C2 to C1 and a type-b individual from C1 to C2; and second, moving a type-w individual from C1 to C2 and a type-b individual from C2 to C1. When either C1 or C2 is completely comprised of type-w individuals, only one perturbation is possible. Note also that by Observation 4, with segregation is equal to 0 or , and the marginal individual will be confined to incomes above or below these levels, respectively. sorting as one in which, at each point where = , . In the case of a regular sorting there are an odd number of equilibria. Moreover, if there are n such equilibria, are stable, the analog of the index theorem in our model. 10 Although a proof is beyond the scope of this paper, in general it will be the case that the sorting is regular "almost everywhere"
in the set of preference parameters and income distributions (as in Debreu 1970 ).
The example illustrated in Figure 1 has three equilibria, and only the two symmetric segregated equilibria are stable. This result is not limited to this example. For any specification satisfying the general preferences in Section 2.1, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.
Whenever , there will be three equilibria: two stable segregated equilibria with = 1 and = 1-2β, respectively, and one unstable integrated equilibrium with PCTw C1 = 1-β.
Proof: See the appendix
When there are no differences in the public good, individuals sort solely based on demographics, resulting in segregation.
We now turn to an analysis of cases where public good levels differ across communities.
To build intuition for how relationships change when public goods differ, Figure 2 replicates the example from Figure 1 but now for a case with unequal public good levels (G C1 =0.9 and G C2 =1).
Because the set of feasible demographic compositions is independent of public good levels, the 10 The proof follows the logic of proposition 1, and we sketch it briefly. Consider the sorting at = 1-2β and consider two cases. In case 1, ≤ and this is a stable equilibrium (with C2 all-w). Consider three subcases. (1a) If the bid functions never cross, then this is the only equilibrium. (1b) If the bid functions cross an even number of times, there is only the one segregated equilibrium plus the even integrated equilibria, totaling an odd number of equilibria. In addition, half the integrated equilibria will occur with type-b's boundary income bid function cutting type-w's from above, indicating stability. Thus, are stable. (1c) If the bid functions cross an odd number of times, there will be a second segregated equilibrium at = 1, with ≤ . That is, there will be an odd number of integrated equilibria plus two segregated equilibria, totaling an odd number of equilibria. In addition, if there are m integrated equilibria, will be stable. With 2, this means there will be stable equilibria again. Though we omit them for brevity, these sub-cases can be repeated for case 2, where at = 1-2β, to complete the proof. Note here the importance of the notion of the "regular" economy. Without it, there may be additional equilibria where the two groups' boundary income bid functions are just tangent, or even an interval of equilibria. Panel 3 shows the impact of the differential public good levels on the boundary income functions. When public goods were equated across communities, both types were indifferent at the point where = . As a result, even though relative preferences for communities switch at this point, reversing the income sorting, the boundary income functions were continuous (though kinked) at the indifference point. Differential public good levels separate the indifference point for the two types moving them away from equal sorting.
Consequently, the boundary income functions now have a discontinuity at each type's indifference point.
Finally, Panel 4 of Figure 2 presents the boundary income bid functions under the new public good levels. In spite of the discontinuity in Boundary Incomes, The Boundary Bid
Functions are continuous at this point. This continuity, which will always hold, occurs because the bid function at the point of indifference is by definition equal to zero and approaches zero continuously from both sides. In terms of potential equilibria, the model remains qualitatively similar to the case where the public good levels were equal. There are still two stable segregated equilibria and one unstable integrated equilibrium, with the location of the unstable integrated equilibrium now shifted slightly to the right to where = 0.76. Thus, for small differences in public good levels, it is possible to support a segregated equilibrium with all typeb individuals in the high public good community. However, comparison of the bid functions in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that, at least for this example, if the public good gap were to increase further, then this equilibrium will no longer be supported. As we shall see below, this result holds in general.
As the public good gap increases, it becomes difficult to make general statements regarding the character of equilibria. As is clear from an examination of Equation 10, the slopes of the bid functions are highly sensitive to local variations in the density of the income functions and the relative curvatures of the utility functions. For instance, it is relatively straightforward to generate examples with multiple segregated and multiple stable and unstable integrated equilibria when the public good differentials are moderate in size.
Nevertheless, the model does provide sharp predictions regarding equilibria for cases with "small" or "large" differences in public goods, and a comparison of these two polar cases provides important policy insights. We begin by considering the case with small differences in the public goods levels. As stated in Proposition 2, the case where the level of public goods is the same in each community always has one unstable integrated equilibrium and two symmetric stable segregated equilibria. This proposition extends to a measure of as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
For any given level of , there exists < such that for all < < there will be exactly three equilibria, two symmetric stable segregated equilibria and one unstable integrated equilibrium.
Proof: See the appendix
Proposition 3 addresses the case where differences between the public good levels are small enough that demographic preferences dominate in the determination of equilibria. It states that in this range, the stable equilibria are characterized by segregation of the types.
We also note that while difficult to formalize because of the complexity of the Boundary
Bid Function relationship presented in Equation 10
, it is the case that for all "standard" parameterizations of the model that we have evaluated, the equilibrium with the lower income minority group in the low public good community is stable over a much broader range of public good differences than is the equilibrium with this lower income minority group in the high public good community.
Consider now the opposite extreme, where differences in public goods are very large and effectively drive the sorting behavior, swamping any effect of the demographics. Intuitively, this case will resemble earlier results from Epple et al. (1984) and other related papers with only a public goods component. In particular, individuals will be stratified by income instead of segregated by race.
To operationalize this intuition in our model, assume that, for given levels of , , , ∞. 11 Then, at the limit, the boundary income bid functions are equal to the boundary incomes themselves, and both types view Community 2 as more desirable regardless of demographic sorting. By construction (Condition 2), the richest type-b individual is richer than the boundary type-w individual when = 1-2β, and the poorest type-b individual is poorer than the boundary type-w individual when = 1. As a result, the boundary income of type-b individuals crosses the boundary income of type-w individuals exactly once from above. This situation has a single equilibrium. The equilibrium is stable and integrated, with all individuals with income above the population median income locating in Community 2. Proposition 4 formalizes this result. That is, when public good differences are sufficiently large, the communities will be integrated by group but stratified by income. In general, how "large" the differences must be will depend on the preferences and income distributions.
Proposition 4
Even with perfect stratification by income, the high public good community will still have a higher proportion of type-w residents than C1:
Proposition 5
Under the conditions of Proposition 4, for sufficiently low G C1 , > . Proof: See the appendix.
The proof of Proposition 5 follows intuitively from Condition (1), first-order stochastic dominance in the income distributions. Essentially, since type-w are richer on average, when there is perfect stratification by income then the richer community also has a higher share of 17 type w. In this way, our model captures as a special case the earlier insights from McGuire (1974), who showed how segregation can be driven by group differences in the willingness to pay for public goods. It also speaks to important policy issues. For example, the "environmental justice" movement has shown that minorities are disproportionately exposed to pollution (e.g. Bullard 2000) . Thus, our model formalizes the idea that discrimination (at least in pollution patterns) is not necessary to drive observed correlations in the consumption of public goods such as environmental quality. Those correlations may be driven by differences in incomes and sorting on amenities (see also Been 1994) .
To summarize the discussion so far, when public good levels in the two communities are relatively similar, all equilibria are segregated. At intermediate differences in public good levels it is difficult to make general statements about equilibria. However, the stable segregated equilibria with all type-b individuals in Community 1 will exist over at least part of this range.
Finally, when differences in public good levels are high there will be a single stable equilibrium with integration.
To further illustrate the implications of Propositions 3 and 4, Figure 3 displays the bid functions for the specification of Figures 1 and 2-fixing we are in the realm of Proposition 3 with two stable segregated equilibria and one unstable integrated equilibrium. The figure illustrates the results of Propositions 3 and 4. Namely, when public good differences are large, integrated equilibria (with income stratification) are especially salient. When public good differences shrink, segregated equilibria are especially salient. Figure 4 shows how the equilibria evolve as G C1 improves. On the vertical axis it shows levels of PCTw C1 that are sustainable as equilibria for different levels of G C1 , shown on the horizontal axis. The figure continues to illustrate the example shown in Figure 3 . The far left of the figure, at very low levels of G C1 , has a single integrated equilibrium. As G C1 improves, PCTw C1 decreases slightly as richer minorities migrate into C1. Then a "tipping point" is reached, with whites "fleeing" C1 to the full extent possible in equilibrium, with the communities becoming completely segregated. Eventually, as G C1 improves to the point that it is better than G C2 , rich whites begin to move in and the process slowly reverses, until another tipping point is reached and "gentrification" leads to the community becoming all-w. Finally, as the public good gap between C1 and C2 gets "large" we return to income sorting (now with the richest households locating in C1.
Discussion
These results speak to at least three important policy and empirical issues in the literature.
The first and most central to our application are policy concerns centered on the correlation between low-income and/or minority populations and the levels of local public goods like public school quality, public safety, parks and green space, and environmental quality. The "environmental justice movement," for example, has highlighted such correlations with air pollution and local toxic facilities (see e.g. Been 1994 , Bullard 2000 . Our model confirms the intuition that such sorting can be the outcome of sorting by income when there are substantial income differentials between groups. More interestingly, racial preferences can strengthen this result, directly and indirectly. First, with the white community mostly white, it will be less attractive to minorities. Second, it will also be more expensive simply because of its whiteness.
Both factors will tend to drive even fairly rich minorities into the minority district (a theme raised in the law literature by, e.g., Ford 1994).
However, both advocates and analysts have raised concerns that improving public goods in low-quality neighborhoods may drive gentrification (Sieg et al. 2004 , Banzhaf and McCormick 2006 , NEJAC 2006 This result is also related to the work of Bayer et al. (2005) and Sethi and Somanathan (2006) , who find that increasing the number of high socio-economic status minorities can increase segregation. They find that such people-based policies have this effect because richer minorities now have enough mass to form their own high public-good communities. Our results suggest that place-based policies pose the same dilemma, but for a different reason: group-based sorting becomes more salient with less reason to sort on the exogenous public good. It appears that segregation is a deep-rooted social problem.
A second application of our model is to the recent revival of interest in "tipping models" of racial segregation (e.g. Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008, Pancs and Vriend, 2007) . However, although Schelling (1969 Schelling ( , 1971 ) noted the link between public goods and demographic sorting in his early work, the role of public goods has generally been under appreciated in recent models of segregation. For example, Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) recently have conducted a study of "tipping" behavior in US Cities. They identify tipping points using tract-level data, looking for break points in the change in the white population as a flexible function of the baseline minority composition of the tract. They assume tipping points are identical for all tracts within a metropolitan area. However, our model suggests this is unlikely to be the case. When two tracts have large differences in locational amenities, integration is supportable even with large proportions of minorities. Conversely, when tracts have small differences in amenities, only low levels of integration can be supported before tipping occurs. In other words, one community with, say, 20% minorities and high public goods may continue to attract whites, while another even with 15% minorities and low public goods may not. This may be one reason more noise appears in Card, Mas and Rothstein's predictions about demographic changes around their estimated tipping point (see their Figure 4 ). Our model suggests more precise results could be obtained by adjusting for differences in public goods using multiple regression or other methods.
Third, our results may help explain recent empirical puzzles about the demographic effects of cleanup. As noted above, the environmental justice literature shows that the presence of minority households is correlated with undesirable facilities like hazardous waste sites. But recently, using difference-in-difference methods, Cameron and McConnaha (2006) , Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) , and Vigdor (2009) have found that improvements to such sites do not appear to reduce these correlations. They suggest this may be because of long-lasting "stigma" of the sites or the ineffectualness of cleanup. Our results suggest another explanation: the reduced form relationship may change after a cleanup, so that the correlation between pollution and race becomes even stronger, not weaker as supposed in the literature. To illustrate this point, consider the difference-in-difference relationships that come out of the previous example. Figure   5 plots the relationship between G j and for our two communities, with G C2 =1 and G
C1
taking on each of the values used in Figure 3 (0.25 to 0.9). The lines in the bottom panel shows the cross-sectional relationships for each value of G C1 . The lines illustrating the cross-sectional relationships become successively steeper as G C1 improves, consistent with our finding that racial correlations strengthen with improving G C1 , as sorting on race becomes more salient. The top panel shows difference-in-differences for each successive improvement in G C1 . Together, the two panels clearly show that while the cross-sectional differences have the expected negative slope, the difference-in-differences have the opposite slope.
One way to think about this problem is in terms of a mis-specification of the standard difference-in-differences regression. Our model suggests that the correlation between race and public goods increases as the low public good community sees increases in its public good level.
Consider the reduced form relationships between minority compositions and pollution in community j in two time periods (0 and 1):
,
with time-specific intercepts t in each of the two time periods, time-invariant fixed effects for each community, α j , and time-specific pollution effects β 1 > β 0 > 0. First differencing the equations leads to:
If is omitted from equation (13), the estimate of β 1 will be biased downward when Δ and are negatively correlated (i.e. if the dirtiest areas are being cleaned up). In this case, the problem may simply be one of omitted variables. Including baseline pollution levels is suggested as a control. Although this kind of Oaxaca procedure is common in the labor literature, the literature on local public goods has tended to ignore its importance. Our model shows why it is important to take account of the changes in the reduced form relationships.
Empirical Example
In essence, our model predicts that an exogenous improvement in public goods that closes the public goods gap across neighborhoods will change locational equilibria in such a way as to put more emphasis on sorting by race. 14 As discussed above, the models theoretical predictions are generally consistent with recent empirical results on gentrification and the impacts of environmental remediation. However, these empirical results are clearly rather weak evidence as to the model's empirical relevance. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no extant work that bears directly on this question. As an initial attempt to fill this gap, we now turn to an analysis of 14 It might seem equally true that it should put less emphasis on sorting by income. However, this is not necessarily so. The reason can be seen in the logic of Figure 5 . As G C1 rises and PCTw C1 falls, both effects lead to a higher absolute value of the slope in the cross-sectional relationship between race and G. In contrast, as G C1 rises and mean income rises in C1, there are two offsetting effects on the cross-sectional relationship between income and G.
the demographic shifts associated with large reductions in localized toxic air emissions that occurred in California between 1990 and 2000 -using a data set previously assembled by Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) .
At the core of the data are 25,166 "communities" defined by a set of tangent half-mile diameter circles evenly distributed across the urbanized portion of California. This approach has the virtue of establishing equally sized communities with randomly drawn boundaries, in contrast to political and census boundaries which may be endogenous. These neighborhoods are 
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Emissions from each plant are assumed to disperse uniformly over a half-mile buffer zone, and are allocated to each residential community accordingly. The data are also matched to 1990 and 2000 block-level census data on the total populations of each racial group. These block-level data are aggregated to the circle-communities assuming uniform distributions within each block. See Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) for additional details including summary statistics.
Ten percent of our communities were exposed to at least some TRI emissions in the baseline period (1988) (1989) (1990) , with 4 percent of our communities (or approximately 40% of those exposed in [1988] [1989] [1990] losing their exposure by 1998-2000. Figure 6 shows the link between baseline TRI exposure and the 10-year change in emissions. The figure clearly demonstrates that the largest pollution reductions occurred in the communities with the highest baseline emissions.
Thus, these improvements are consistent with the "large" improvements in low-public good communities described above.
Using these data, we test for changes in the structural relationships between race and pollution over time. I e n particular, w estimate (14) where is an indicator for whether community j was "exposed" to TRI pollution (i.e. was within a half-mile of at least one such facility) in year t and is the continuous level of air emissions from nearby facilities allocated to community j. The variable E captures the extensive margin and any non-air pollution related disamenity of the polluting facilities (visual, noise, smell), while I captures the intensive margin, namely emissions weighted by EPA's toxicity index.
A key challenge in identifying changes predicted by the model is the likely presence of confounding influences in other important location specific attributes. Our approach to controlling for unobserved spatial amenities is to employ in L j successively more stringent timeinvariant neighborhood dummies, including controls for latitude and distance from the coast, school district dummies and zip code dummies. These effects should capture unobserved public goods that vary on a spatial scale that exceeds that of the pollution impacts from TRI facilities.
School district fixed effects have the advantage of mapping directly into an important but difficult-to-measure local public good while zip code fixed effects control for locational amenities that vary on spatial scale much smaller than that of a school district. The table clearly shows that as the public goods gap shrinks from 1990 to 2000, sorting on race increased-precisely the predictions in the model. As the time-invariant locational controls get more local, the estimated levels of the cross-sectional sorting parameter shrink, perhaps because of unobservables or perhaps simply because less variation remains for estimating the model. But in all cases, the estimated change in the relationship is consistently in the range of 2-3 percentage points and highly significant. That is, the effect of a "typical" polluting plant was associated with more minorities in both years, but in 2000 the typical plant was associated with an increase in nearby minorities 2-3 percentage points more than the same sized plant in 1990.
These results assume that the same reduced form relationship between race and pollution holds throughout California. But if pollution reductions are spread unevenly across the state, then changes in the equilibrium sorting patterns may also be uneven. A sharper test of the models prediction requires evaluating how the change in the reduced form relationship relates to the size of the public goods improvement. To test for this effect, we next allow the pollution parameter to change differently in each county. In particular, we replicate the above model, interacting the 2000 pollution coefficients with the average level of pollution reductions in the community's county. Controlling for zip code dummies, we find that in the average county, a typical plant continued to be associated with more nearby minorities in 2000 than 1990, by 3.7 percentage points, quite close to the results shown in Table 1 . However, this masks important heterogeneity. A county experiencing no change in pollution saw only a 2.2 percentage point change in the effect of a typical plant on the percentage of minorities, while the county experiencing the greatest improvement in pollution saw a 5.5 percentage point change in such sorting. These differences are statistically significant and directly support the models prediction.
Finally, we note that this empirical analysis shows that in both 1990 and 2000 there was a negative relationship between minority percentage and public good levels (in this case the absence of polluting facilities); with the relationship strengthening following the public good improvement. However, consistent with the above discussion, a naïve interpretation of the simple differences-in-differences relationship would lead to the conclusion that higher public good levels were associated with higher minority percentages.
Conclusions
In Progress Estimates are for the effect of Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%.
Appendix.

Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by noting that when public good levels are equal: 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition follows directly from Proposition 2 together with the continuity of the boundary income bid functions and the implicit function theorem. It states that the single unstable integrated equilibrium and the segregated equilibrium with all type-b individuals in C2 that are present when public goods are equal continues to hold and are the only possible equilibria for at least small perturbations in the G's around this point.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We prove this proposition in four steps.
Part (i).
We begi e-writing n by r Equation 4 as follows:
By assumption, Bid y → y as G C1 →-∞. Thus, by the Inada conditions →∞. Therefore, for sufficiently low G C1 , the entire term in brackets → 0 and we can focus on the first term .
As In other words, the boundary income bid function is monotonically increasing in PCTw C1 for type w and monotonically decreasing for type b.
Part (ii).
Next, note that at PCTw C1 =1-2β, = and = .
1 2 given β<0.5.
Again, since Bid y → y, it follows that = and = 1 2 . Using Equation (1), we then have > . Note that by Observation 4, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Part (iii)
Similarly, note that at PCTw C1 =1, = =0 and = .
> 0. Thus > = 0.
Again, by Observation 4, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Part (iv)
We now combine parts (i) to (iii). By part (ii), we have that at PCTw C1 =1-2β, > .
By part (i), we know is monotonically decreasing in PCTw C1 and is monotonically increasing. By part (iii) we have that at PCTw C1 =1, < . Therefore, the two boundary income bid functions cross once, with crossing from above. This is a stable integrated equilibrium. Moreover, as noted above the segregated equilibria are ruled out by Observation 4.
Therefore, a single equilibrium exists, it is integrated, and it is stable.
Proof of Proposition 5.
By Observation (5), in an integrated equilibrium = .
Since Bid y → y as G C1 →-∞, it follows that = . By first order stochastic dominance, F( /F( ≥ 1.
Therefore, This shows that the ratio of type b to t e C than C2. Adding 1 written as ype w is high r in 1 1 1 1 1 to both sides of the e i verting both sides quation and n leads to 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , which is the desired result. 3.1e+08
